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Abstract 
 
Pre-commitment is a relatively new harm minimization strategy for problem gambling.  To date, its 
primary use has been in casino self-exclusion programs, a few Internet gambling sites, and to limit land-
based EGM play in a few jurisdictions.  Empirical research on it is quite limited, but does tend to indicate 
that it holds significant promise as an additional technique to promote responsible gambling and to limit 
the harms associated with problem gambling.  Drawing on the existing research, as well as lessons of 
problem gambling prevention research, it is reasonable to surmise that the degree to which pre-
commitment is voluntary, revocable, exceedable, of short duration, available for just some EGMs or 
some Internet sites, available for just some forms of gambling, and does not use biometric ID, is the 
degree to which the technique is primarily of benefit to non-problem gamblers (which may or may not 
translate into a decreased future incidence of problem gambling).  In contrast, the degree to which all 
avenues for excessive gambling have been closed, is the degree to which the technique likely has 
broader utility for problem and non-problem gamblers.  
 
 
 
What is Pre-Commitment? 
 
“Pre-commitment” refers to a harm 
minimization strategy whereby pre-set limits on 
time, frequency, or money spent gambling are 
registered prior to the start of play.  Pre-
commitment usually refers to player-initiated 
limits, to distinguish it from the limits that may 
be imposed by the operator, government, or 
the actual gambling format.  Pre-commitment is 
believed to be a useful harm minimization 
strategy because it  a) allows the player to make 
more rational decisions about gambling 
involvement prior to actually engaging in 
gambling (Parke et al., 2008) and  b) obliges the 
player to keep to these preset limits.  Research 
indicates it is fairly common for regular 
gamblers (including problem gamblers) to have 
budgetary limits in mind prior to gambling 
(McDonnell-Phillips, 2006).  However, research 
also indicates that these limits are often 
exceeded (McDonnell-Phillips, 2006). 
 
 
How is pre-commitment currently being used? 
 
Casino Self-Exclusion 
 
Casino self-exclusion programs represent a 
form of pre-commitment.  Informal self-
exclusion programs have been used by various 
casinos since at least the 1960s.  The first 
formal program was initiated in 1989 in 
Manitoba, Canada, coincident with the opening 
of the country’s first permanent, year-round 
casino.  Since that time, many casinos and 
jurisdictions around the world have adopted 
self-exclusion programs  (Nowatzki & Williams, 
2002; Responsible Gambling Council, 2008; 
Williams, West, & Simpson, 2007; 2008).   
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The features of these programs vary depending 
on the jurisdiction.  The contract may apply to 
just one casino, or to all casinos in the 
jurisdiction.  In a few jurisdictions, the exclusion 
extends to other gambling venues such as bingo 
halls or racetracks.  Self-exclusion programs 
usually require casino operators to remove 
excludees from mailing lists.  The policy may 
also require casinos to refer to their list of self-
excluded persons before issuing new player 
loyalty cards, cashing cheques, extending credit, 
or paying out large jackpots.  Self-exclusion 
contracts are usually irrevocable for the time 
period covered, although a few jurisdictions 
have a process for agreements to be revoked 
before they expire.  Some jurisdictions offer a 
fixed time period, whereas others offer a choice 
of ban length, ranging from 6 months to 
lifetime.  Requirements for re-entry vary, with 
some jurisdictions having no requirements and 
others requiring a waiting period, a formal 
review process, or a gambling education 
seminar.  Most countries1  require government 
issued ID at the entrance which is scanned and 
compared to the digitized self-excluder list.  In 
countries that do not require ID, security 
personnel are required to identify self-excluders 
from a book of photographs.  In some 
jurisdictions, people who breach their contracts 
are simply asked to leave.  In other jurisdictions, 
they may be subject to a trespassing charge 
and/or fine. 
 
In addition to absolute bans, certain countries 
(Netherlands, Denmark), offer casino ‘visit 
limitation contracts’ (Williams et al., 2008).  The 
requirement to show ID at Dutch casinos gives 
Holland Casino the ability to track the frequency 
of casino visitation.  If there has been a 
significant increase in visitation frequency or 
                                                      
1
 For Western countries this includes:  Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldava, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.   
 
the person has had 20 visits a month over the 
past 3 months then the person is automatically 
approached to see whether they would like to 
sign a visit limitation contract or self-exclusion 
contract. 
 
Internet Gambling 
 
Pre-commitment has been offered for several 
years on a small portion of the ~2,300 existing 
online gambling sites (Wood & Williams, 2009).  
Here again, the pre-commitment parameters 
available to the player vary depending on the 
site.  Most common are deposit limits (e.g., 
daily, weekly, monthly); bet size limits; loss 
limits (e.g., weekly, monthly, yearly); short-term 
exclusion from certain game types (e.g., 6 
months); and short- total account suspension 
(e.g., 6 months).  For most sites, deposit and 
loss limits tend to be revocable, but self-
exclusion irrevocable.   
 
Some of the voluntary online gaming regulatory 
bodies (e.g., e-Commerce and Online Gaming 
Regulation and Assurance (eCOGRA)) require 
some form of pre-commitment for site 
accreditation.  In the case of eCOGRA, sites are 
required to allow the player to set a maximum 
bet limit as well as to self-exclude for periods of 
time. 
 
Currently, there is no system in operation which 
links all Internet gambling sites within a 
jurisdiction, or across jurisdictions, with an 
integrated self-exclusion or pre-commitment 
regime. 
 
Plastic/Smart Cards for Land-Based Gambling 
 
Most of us are familiar with simple magnetic 
strip plastic cards with an associated PIN 
(Personal Identification Number).  A ‘smart 
card’ is any pocket-sized plastic card with 
embedded integrated circuits providing some 
limited memory and/or microprocessor 
capabilities when interacting with external card-
reading devices.  They can be used for 
identification, authentication, data storage, and 
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application processing.  In gambling, these 
devices have been most common used as a 
Player Loyalty/Reward card and/or a debit card 
for cashless gambling.  However, a few 
jurisdictions have used plastic cards and smart 
cards that enable gamblers to establish limits 
on their gambling behaviour. 
 
Australia 2 
The Crown Casino, in Melbourne, Victoria was 
the first casino in the world to introduce player 
pre-commitment monetary limits on their 
EGMs
3
 in 2002 using a simple plastic card with a 
PIN.  However, play did not stop when limits 
were met and players did not have to carry ID 
to play.  Beginning in December 2010 all new 
“next generation” EGMs in Victoria will have to 
have a pre-commitment mechanism that allows 
a player to pre-set time and loss limits.  All 
EGMs in the state of Victoria (i.e., 30,000 in 550 
venues) will have to have such a system by 
2013.  However, use of pre-commitment by 
players will be voluntary. 
Queensland conducted its first trial of voluntary 
pre-commitment in 2005 at a single venue.  In 
2008-2009, Queensland conducted another trial 
of pre-commitment of time and monetary 
expenditure in two venues using a cashless 
gaming system.  Currently, pre-commitment 
card-based gambling is operational across 48 
gambling venues.  However, use by the player 
and by the venue is voluntary.    
 
In 2008, Worldsmart Technology conducted a 
trial of smart card time and spending pre-
commitment via their loyalty cards in South 
Australia.  However, similar to Victoria, play was 
allowed to continue after limits had been had 
                                                      
2
 Further details of the Australian pre-commitment 
systems are contained in the Productivity 
Commission (2010). 
 
3
 EGMs refers to slot machines, video lottery 
terminals, electronic keno, poker machines, fruit 
machines, fixed-odd terminals, etc. 
 
been reached and players were not required to 
use their loyalty card to play.  In 2009, Global 
Gaming Industries conducted a similar trial 
using player cards with radio frequency ID tags 
(RFID) in two venues. 
New South Wales has some provision for pre-
commitment on loss limits on cashless / card-
based gambling. 
Nova Scotia, Canada 
The Nova Scotia Gaming Corporation (NSGC) 
piloted the use of pre-commitment smart card 
between 2005 to 2007.  As a result of this 
research, NSGC is currently in the process of 
installing an ‘Informed Player Choice System’ – 
more recently referred to as ‘My-Play’ - on all of 
the province’s 2,800 video lottery terminals 
(VLTs).  Players begin by registering with the 
system using their driver’s license or other 
government–issued ID to obtain a plastic card 
and an associated PIN.4  This information is used 
to create a unique identifier, with no personally 
identifying information retained on the central 
system.  The card is then placed into a VLT to 
use the machine as well as to access player 
information tools.  These tools allow the player 
to  a) determine amount spent in the past day, 
week, month, or year;  b) set daily, weekly, 
monthly, or yearly limits on spending;  c) set 
daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly limits on 
amount of time they wish to play; and  d) lock 
themselves out for 1-3 days.  
 
Use of a card is currently voluntary.  Limits are 
irrevocable.  NSGC has indicated that Non-
problem gamblers are the primary target of this 
system in an effort to reduce the future 
incidence of problem gambling. 
 
Sweden 
The state owned gambling operator, Svenska 
Spel, began offering a smart card in 2006 
coincident with the launch of its online poker 
site.  This card can now be used for its online 
                                                      
4
 Venue-assisted enrollment is possible with 2 pieces 
of ID (e.g., Health Card/Phone Bill).   
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poker and sports betting, as well as for land-
based bingo, lotteries, and sports betting.  Card 
use is mandatory only for online gambling.  To 
use the card, the card number, username and 
password are required.  The card allows players 
to  a) transfer money onto the card from their 
bank account;  b) see a summary of their past 
12 months of gambling behaviour;  c) set 
monetary spending limits;  d) set time limits;  e) 
exclude themselves for brief periods of time;  
and  f) obtain a risk assessment of their 
behaviour.  ‘PlayScan’ is the risk assessment 
tool that compares the player’s behaviour 
against known problematic gambling behaviour.  
It allegedly can determine whether a player is 
currently experiencing problematic levels of 
gambling behavior and/or is at risk for future 
problems.  For online poker, it is mandatory for 
players to set their own limits regarding day, 
week, and month money spending, as well as 
session, day and month time limits.  However, 
there is no maximum time or monetary limit.  If 
the customer wants to increase their limits, 
they need to wait 24 hours whereas decreased 
limits take immediate effect.  Players are kept 
informed of how close they are to their limits. 
 
Norway 
In 1992 Norway’s state owned gambling 
operator, Norsk Tipping, introduced a magnetic 
strip player card allowing lottery purchases to 
be directly made from a person’s bank account 
and any winnings directly deposited.  By 2005 
all of these cards were replaced with smart 
cards for enhanced security.  Since February 
2009 the use of these smart cards has become 
mandatory for all forms of gambling (online 
gambling, sports betting, EGMs) except lotteries 
and instant win tickets.  Players can use the 
cards on their home computers with the use of 
an accompanying card reader.  Because the 
cards are connected with the player’s bank 
account, money can be put directly onto them.  
Players can also add money to their card by 
giving cash to retailers, who then put a credit 
for that amount onto the card.  Norsk Tipping 
limits the amount that can be put on the card to 
400 kroner per day or 2200 Kroner per month.  
The card provides play summaries, money and 
time limit setting (i.e., players can set lower 
limits than mandated by Norsk Tipping), 
exclusion for up to 100 days, and risk 
assessment.  For EGMs (called Interactive Video 
Terminals, IVT) 5 players must insert their card, 
verify their player ID, and then remove the card 
before they can start playing.  After one hour of 
continuous play, the EGM refuses that player’s 
bets for a 10-minute cooling off period.   
 
New Zealand 
The New Zealand online lottery (which 
commenced in 2008) requires players to set 
weekly and monthly spending limits, with a 
maximum of NZ $150/week and $300/month.  
Self-exclusion for certain types of lottery games 
is also available. 
 
Singapore 
The government of Singapore has mandated 
pre-commitment for all forms of gambling 
within their two casinos by 2011.  The limits 
that are set also apply across all forms of casino 
gambling.  Singapore also employs casino self-
exclusion (with ID checks at the door). 
 
 
How effective is pre-commitment? 
 
There is very limited research on the 
effectiveness of casino self-exclusion, and that 
which exists tends to be of poor quality and 
conducted in jurisdictions without effective 
detection systems (Williams & Nowatzki, 2002; 
Productivity Commission, 2010; Responsible 
Gambling Council, 2008; Williams, 2010).  A full 
discussion of self-exclusion effectiveness is 
beyond a scope of this paper.   However, suffice 
to say that evidence tends to indicate that  a) 
only a small portion of at risk and problem 
gamblers are aware of casino self-exclusion 
programs and an even smaller percentage ever 
utilize them;  b) most people who self-exclude 
tend to report that the program was helpful in 
                                                      
5
 IVTs were privately operated until 2003 and then 
taken over by Norsk Tipping. 
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reducing or stopping their gambling for a short 
period of time (and a small minority for longer 
periods of time);  c) in jurisdictions that do not 
require ID, a large percentage of people re-
enter the casino during their ban without  being 
detected;  d) the overall effectiveness of the 
program is presumed to be much higher in 
jurisdictions that require ID for entry (Williams 
& Nowatzki, 2002; Productivity Commission, 
2010; Responsible Gambling Council, 2008; 
Williams, 2010). 
 
Anecdotally, problems have been expressed 
about the effectiveness of pre-commitment 
when non-pre-commitment EGMs are also 
readily available (as is the case in New South 
Wales (NSW)) (Nisbet, 2005).   There is also a 
concern that because of the significant amount 
initially put on the card (e.g., $200 in NSW) 
gamblers may increase spending, either due to 
more money being readily available or because 
they require less embarrassing interactions with 
cashiers and other gambling venue staff (Parke 
et al., 2008).  That being said, people who have 
opted to use cards for the purposes of pre-
commitment and have agreed to report on their 
use tend to indicate that the card helped them 
manage their spending (Nisbet, 2005).   
 
Schrans, Grace and Schellinck (2004) found that 
a feature allowing players to set a time limit on 
their VLT play was only effective in influencing 
one of the six behaviours being targeted for 
improvement.   
 
Focal Research Consultants (2007) tracked VLT 
play for a 6 month period in a region of Nova 
Scotia that only had player-card activated 
machines available (~51 EGMs in 9 locations 
played by 1,824 players).  Roughly 71% of 
regular players (i.e., playing once a month or 
more) opted to try one of the responsible 
gambling (RG) features these cards permitted 
(i.e., spending limit,  time limit, 2 day exclusion, 
or playing history).  Roughly 65% of these 
people continued to use one or more RG 
features in subsequent sessions.  A subsample 
of these RG adopters (n = 122) had a baseline 
period of non-RG use that allowed for a pre-
post comparison.  These individuals were found 
to have a significant decrease in per session 
expenditure ($47 to $40), an increase in play 
length (82 min to 98 min), and no change in 
frequency of play per month (9.3 to 9.3).  
Examination of individuals with high risk 
characteristics found no decrease in 
expenditure for high frequency players (18+ 
times in 6 months), and a tendency toward 
decreased per session expenditure that was 
offset by a tendency toward increased 
frequency of play for people with Canadian 
Problem Gambling Index (CPGI) scores of 5 or 
higher.  It was also found that approximately 
37% of players swapped cards and/or obtained 
them from venue staff to circumvent the 
system, with this being particularly true for 
people with higher CPGI scores (Bernhard et al., 
2006; Omnifacts Bristol Research, 2007).  
  
Preliminary results from the 2009 Worldsmart 
South Australian (SA) trial showed that less than 
1% of loyalty card holders had voluntarily 
activated the pre-commitment options on their 
card (Productivity Commission, 2010).  For 
those who did, the most popular options were 
limits on:  daily spending (59% of cards); breaks 
in play (19%); weekly spending (14%); monthly 
spending (12%); daily duration of play (10%); 
monthly duration of play (8%); fortnight 
spending (6%); weekly duration of play (4%); 
fortnight duration of play (4%); and spending 
history (3%).  Utilization of pre-commitment 
features tended to increase with time.  Among 
the 94 individuals with 3 months of baseline 
data, there was a 25% reduction in daily 
turnover subsequent to utilization of pre-
commitment.  However, it is possible these 
individuals continued to gamble and just 
decreased use of their voluntary card.  There 
were also 600 instances where players 
exceeded their pre-established limits (in the SA 
system, when a limit has been met it can be 
overridden by venue staff).  It is unknown what 
percentage of pre-commitment breaches this 
600 figure represents (Productivity Commission, 
2010).   
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Results from the 2009 Queensland 
Maxgaming’s Simplay system showed that only 
15% of Simplay cardholders opted to use pre-
commitment, although this percentage may be 
higher for at-risk groups (Productivity 
Commission, 2010).  The most popular option 
(used by 45 out of 340 people) was a daily 
spending limit.  No one set playing time limits.  
Thirty of the 45 people setting spending limits 
exceeded them on at least one occasion.  There 
was tentative evidence that expenditure may 
have decreased subsequent to limit setting.  
However, here again, this assumes that players 
did not continue playing using cash (i.e., once a 
limit was exceeded the only consequence was 
the inability to use the card for cashless 
gaming).  Since the system has been expanded 
throughout Queensland approximately 14,000 
people have opted to use this voluntary system.  
Of these people, 9% have set spending limits 
(with this percentage increasing over time).    
 
Results from the Odyssey trial in Queensland 
were similar, with only 5% of players (n = 66) 
opting into cashless gaming (that would also 
allow pre-commitment), and 28% of these latter 
individuals opting to set a daily spending limit.  
Sixty percent of users reported that pre-
commitment was useful, with this percentage 
being higher for high-risk players.  There was 
also a 40% reduction in spending by players 
who set limits compared to a 3% reduction in 
players who did not set limits.  However, this 
reduction might be offset by increased cash-
based play, as this option continued to be 
available (Productivity Commission, 2010).   
 
Because of the mandatory nature of the 
Swedish and Norwegian systems, a large 
percentage of the gambling population have 
obtained smart cards (in 2008 this was roughly 
1.3 million Swedes and 1.9 million Norwegians) 
(Responsible Gambling Council, 2009). 
 
The Internet Poker Committee (2008) (cited in 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2009) surveyed 
approximately 3,000 participants of the Swedish 
online poker pre-commitment system.  
Participants reported that  a) monetary limits 
were more useful than time limits;  b) 1/3 of 
players set monetary limits that were 
excessively high and 40% set time limits that 
were excessively high (essentially disabling the 
pre-commitment system);  c) for individuals 
who hit their limits, 37% went to another online 
site and 32% simply changed their limits;  d) 5% 
of players barred themselves for a period of 
time, with one week being the most common 
length (25% of people who barred themselves 
also began playing online poker at other sites);  
e) 26% used the risk assessment option and 
52% of these individuals found it useful. 
 
Although there is no available empirical 
research on the effectiveness of the Norwegian 
system, it is instructive to note that Norway has 
one of the world’s lowest documented rates of 
problem gambling (significantly lower than 
other Nordic countries such as Finland and 
Sweden) (AGRI, 2010). 
 
In summary, the empirical research on the 
effectiveness of pre-commitment is fairly 
limited, but that which does exist indicates that 
it holds promise as a harm-minimization 
technique.  Part of the problem in evaluating 
pre-commitment concerns the many different 
ways of implementing it (i.e., mandatory or 
voluntary; exceedable vs. nonexceedable limits; 
revocable vs. nonrevocable limits; short vs. long 
duration of limits; presence on all or just some 
EGMs; etc.).  Similar to research on other 
problem gambling prevention initiatives, the 
‘devil is in the details’ and the actual 
effectiveness of a technique is usually very 
much dependent on how it is applied (Williams 
et al., 2007; 2008).  Drawing on the lessons of 
problem gambling prevention research 
(Williams et al., 2007; 2008), it is reasonable to 
surmise that the degree to which pre-
commitment is voluntary, revocable, 
exceedable, of short duration, available for just 
some EGMs or some Internet sites, available for 
just some forms of gambling, and does not use 
biometric ID, is the degree to which the 
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technique is of primary benefit to non-problem 
gamblers (which may or may not translate into 
a decreased future incidence of problem 
gambling). 6  In contrast, the degree to which all 
avenues for excessive gambling have been 
closed, is the degree to which the technique 
likely has broader utility for problem and non-
problem gamblers.7  Similar to what is found for 
other products with some risk of harm (alcohol, 
tobacco, firearms, motor vehicles), the most 
effective overall harm reduction strategies are 
ones that unfortunately also tend to constrain 
and restrict the behaviour of people who are 
not at risk of developing problems (Williams et 
al., 2007; 2008). 
 
 
Elements of an Effective Pre-Commitment 
Regime (for all gamblers) 
 
1. Pre-commitment should be available on 
all EGMs jurisdiction-wide.  EGMs are the most 
problematic form of gambling in western 
countries and are the devices where pre-
                                                      
6
 With reductions subsequent to limit setting in 
problem gamblers having more to do with a resolve 
to decrease gambling, as opposed to any constraints 
imposed by the self-commitment. This is very similar 
to the presumed mechanism for reduced gambling 
seen in casino self-exclusion programs where no 
effective mechanisms for enforcement of the 
contract/program exist.  In other words, the act of 
self-exclusion (or pre-commitment) is reflective of a 
recognition that a problem exists and an intent to do 
something about it, with the self-exclusion contract 
(or act of pre-commitment) being a convenient 
documentation/proclamation of this intent.  Hence, 
the primary driving force behind the reduction in 
gambling is this new-found motivation and 
recognition, rather than the imposed constraints 
(Nowatzki & Williams, 2002).  
 
7
 One of the defining features of problem gambling is 
‘impaired control’ (Neal et al, 2005).  Hence, it is 
naïve to think that simply providing problem 
gamblers with information about their gambling 
and/or ‘choice’ will be sufficient to curb their 
gambling. 
 
commitment has the most harm minimization 
potential.  If pre-commitment implementation 
is not pervasive, problem gamblers will tend to 
seek out geographic locations or EGMs where 
their pre-commitment does not apply.   
 
 
2. Pre-commitment is best applied across 
all forms of gambling.   Problem gamblers will 
seek out less preferred forms of gambling if 
their limits have been met on EGMs.  Pre-
commitment is most easily extended to other 
forms of gambling with existing electronic 
interfaces (e.g., Internet gambling; casinos that 
require ID for entry).  However, electronic 
interfaces could potentially be created for other 
forms of gambling as well.  The biometric USB 
key by Responsible Gaming Networks Pty Ltd is 
particularly well suited for broad application 
across gambling formats because of its built in 
connectivity to the Internet, TV set-top boxes, 
wagering terminals, lottery terminals, and 
mobile phones (Productivity Commission, 2010; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2009; Ryan, 
2010). 
 
 
3. Pre-commitment will be much more 
effective if it is mandatory.  Voluntary use of 
pre-commitment is likely to be low.  Although 
many people indicate they would utilize pre-
commitment if it was available, actual usage 
when it is available is much lower (Parke et al., 
2008).  The effort involved initiating it, stigma, 
privacy concerns, and failure to appreciate the 
benefits are all contributing factors.  Although 
most gamblers do not need to use pre-
commitment, they may find some benefits if 
they did, particularly at-risk and problem 
gamblers.  On the other hand, it is also true that 
there is clinical utility in coming to the 
realization that pre-commitment is needed.   If 
a voluntary or opt-out system is used, it will be 
important that once a person begins using pre-
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commitment that they be obliged to continue 
using it. 8   
 
4. Pre-commitment should offer a range of 
limit types, values and durations.  Monetary 
limits appear to be the most important, but 
there may be a small percentage of people who 
would benefit from time or frequency limits.  A 
wide range of available limits for money, time, 
and frequency would accommodate all types of 
gamblers.  This would include the option of 
setting zero values that would act as a form of 
exclusion.  A recommended duration range for 
these parameters would be 1 day to 5 years.  
The shorter durations would give people the 
opportunity to try different parameters before 
settling on ones that are best for them.  The 
longer durations would enable problem 
gamblers to establish more enduring 
constraints.  Similar to casino self-exclusion, 
most jurisdictions currently only offer a 
selection of short pre-commitment durations, 
which sends the wrong message to problem 
gamblers (the majority of whom will have life-
long propensities to gamble excessively and 
should be establishing long-term constraints).   
 
5. Pre-commitment parameters should not 
be exceedable or revocable.  In the case of 
problem gamblers, pre-commitment is an 
attempt to put external constraints on 
behaviour usually after internal 
limits/constraints have been repeatedly broken.  
Thus, it defeats the purpose of pre-commitment 
to have exceedable or revocable limits 
(otherwise it simply becomes a resolution 
rather than a commitment).   
                                                      
8
 The medication disulfiram (Antabuse) is a 
somewhat analogous harm minimization strategy for 
alcohol abuse.  People who take this medication 
become ill if they consume alcohol within the next 
day or two.  Hence, a person takes disulfiram as a 
form of pre-commitment not to use alcohol.  
However, 50 years of research has demonstrated 
disulfiram to have very poor clinical efficacy because 
alcohol abusers have poor resolve to take the 
medication on a consistent basis (Hughes & Cook, 
2006). 
 
6. A biometric identification system is 
needed.  Some sort of identification system is 
needed so that all versions of the gambling 
format(s) within the jurisdiction recognize the 
individual and his/her preset limits.  It is also 
important that this identity system be 
biometric, otherwise some people (particularly 
problem gamblers) will endeavour to use other 
identities/cards when their own limits have 
been met.  Smart cards with PINs are an 
improvement over regular cards, but still do not 
prevent card swapping, borrowing, or selling.  
Unless the card is used for other important 
purposes, then some gamblers (or potentially 
venue staff) will give away or loan their PIN 
smart card to other players.  A biometric system 
is also the best protection against underage 
gambling.     
 
7. Central storage of pre-commitment 
information is less preferable to storage on the 
player’s pre-commitment interface device.  
Utilization of pre-commitment tends to be fairly 
low, which is partly related to concerns that 
one’s play is being recorded or monitored by 
someone else (Bernhard et al., 2006; Omnifacts, 
2007; Parke et al., 2008).  Significantly greater 
utilization will occur if the player is confident 
his/her gambling behavior is confidential.  
Privacy laws in some jurisdictions will also 
require this (IGA, 2005).  Non-central storage 
also ensures that the gambling provider does 
not use this player data for purposes 
inconsistent with player protection (e.g., 
marketing). 
 
8. Loyalty/reward cards should not be 
used for the purposes of pre-commitment.  
These two things are incompatible, in that 
traditional loyalty/reward cards encourage play, 
whereas pre-commitment technologies 
constrain play. 9  
                                                      
9
 In general, Loyalty/Reward cards are not conducive 
to responsible gambling.  However, if they are to 
exist they should be rewarding responsible play, 
rather than amount of play. 
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I am a full professor in the Addiction Counselling Program, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of 
Lethbridge (Alberta, Canada) as well as a Coordinator for the Alberta Gaming Research Institute.  I have 
published widely in the area of gambling; teach courses on the subject; provide frequent consultation to 
government, industry, and the media; presented my work at many national and international 
conferences; and am currently co-editor of International Gambling Studies, which is one of the two 
primary journals in this field.  I am one of the world’s best funded gambling researchers and also 
recognized as a leading authority in the areas of:  prevention of problem gambling; Internet gambling; 
the socioeconomic impacts of gambling, the proportion of gambling revenue deriving from problem 
gamblers; the prevalence and nature of gambling in Aboriginal communities; and the etiology of 
problem gambling.   
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